We present the largest and longest measurement of online tracking to date based on real users. The data, which is made publicly available, is generated from more than 780 million page loads over the course of the last 10 months. Previous attempts to measure the tracking ecosystem, are done via measurement platforms that do not interact with websites the same way a user does. We instrument a crowd-sourced measurement of third-parties across the web via users who consent to data collection via a browser extension. The collection is done with privacy-by-design in mind, and introduces no privacy side effects. This approach overcomes limitations of previous work by collecting real web usage across multiple countries, ISP and browser configurations, and on difficult to crawl pages, such as those behind logins, giving a more accurate portrayal of the online-tracking ecosystem.
INTRODUCTION
Online tracking is the name given to the process by which third-party services on websites collect and aggregate data about users' activities and actions on the web. A complex and dynamic ecosystem of advertising and analytics has emerged to optimise the monetization of this data, and has grown to such an extent that 77% of pages the average user will visit contain trackers [15] , and with individual trackers present on over 60% of the top 1 million sites [10] .
1 https://github.com/cliqz-oss/whotracks.me Recent work has focused on monitoring this ecosystem, the methods used to fingerprint users and their devices [21] , and the extent to which these methods are being used across the web [4] , as well as quantifying the value exchanges taking place in online advertising [6, 22] . The lack of transparency around which third-party services are present on pages, and what happens to the data they collect is a common concern. By monitoring this ecosystem we can drive awareness of the practices of these services, helping to inform users whether they are being tracked, and for what purpose. This can drive consumer and regulatory pressure onto these companies to change their practices. It also helps us to better quantify the privacy and security implications caused by these services.
Most previous work on measuring tracking prevalence at scale has focused on the engineering of crawlers which emulate a web browser visiting a series of pages [10, 17] . These systems instrument the browser to collect detailed information about each page loaded. This method can scale well, however, bias is introduced by the choice of crawling platform, the location from which the crawl is run, and the selection of sites to crawl. Further limitations exist around getting data from pages behind authentication walls, such as in online banking portals, e-commerce checkout pages, paywalled content, and 'walled gardens' like Facebook and LinkedIn. Lastly, these crawls capture an instantaneous state of the ecosystem, but do not enable longitudinal analysis. Longitudinal studies have typically been done on a smaller scale to one-off crawls [14, 13] .
This work aims to monitor the tracking ecosystem by providing a system for the continuous measurement of the presence of third-parties across the web, and the tracking methods they employ via crowd-sourcing measurement to users who consent to data collection via a browser extension. We deploy a monitoring mechanism which collects data on third-party trackers on pages users load, and employs a privacy-by-design methodology to ensure potential identifiable data or identifiers are removed on the client side before transmission. This enables measurement of tracking as observed by real users during normal browsing activities, at scale, across multiple browsers and physical locations, while respecting the privacy of the users collecting the data. This overcomes may of the issues encountered by crawl-based analyses of tracking.
Using instrumented browsers distributed to users who consent to gathering data during their normal browsing activity can achieve a greater scale than crawling. In previous work, we analysed 21 million pages loaded by 200,000 users in Germany [24] , and analysis of data collected from Ghostery's GhostRank covered 440 million pages for 850,000 users [15] . In this paper we present the WhoTracks.Me dataset, which contains aggregated data on third-party presence and tracking, released monthly. The data is generated by Ghostery and Cliqz users who have consented to anonymized HumanWeb [18] data collection. This generates data on an average of 100 million page loads per month, and currently spans 10 months 2 . This data, in aggregated form, can be used to provide significant insight into the ecosystem of third-party service providers across the web. This knowledge can be used by multiple stakeholders, from researchers and journalists, to regulators and site owners. We publish the aggregated data under a Creative Commons license, to enable derivative analyses based on this data. We also aim to keep this data set updated monthly as new data is collected. This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we describe how online tracking can be measured at scale during normal browser usage. We also describe common tracking methods and how they can be detected using browser extension APIs. In Section 3 we outline our approach to collection of the page load data, and how we prevent this data from being deanonymizable. Section 4 covers how we aggregate the collected data and generate meaningful statistics to describe the tracker ecosystem. We also describe our database which maps over 1000 tracker domains to services and companies which operate them. A selection of results are presented in Section 5, which show the extent of tracking which we have measured from 10 months of data, from a total of 780 million page loads.
The work makes the following contributions:
• The largest longitudinal study of online tracking to date, in terms of number of pages and sites analysed, with a total of 780 million pages analysed, and data on 600 trackers and 600 3 popular websites published.
• A public data set containing aggregated statistics on trackers and websites across the web.
• An open database to attribute common third-party 2 May 2017 to February 2018 3 We intend to increase these numbers as our database grows.
domains to services and companies, containing over 1000 tracker entries.
• A method and implementation of a system for measuring tracking context in the browser, including fingerprinting detection based on [24] .
• A system for the collection of the measured page load data which safeguards the privacy of the users from whom the data originates by removing or obfuscating any potential PII in individual messages, and removing data which could be used to link messages together.
• A website providing information based on the collected data for interested users, and containing educational resources about online tracking.
MEASURING ONLINE TRACKING
Online tracking can be characterised as the collection of data about user interactions during the course of their web browsing. This can range from simply recording which types of browser access a particular page, to tracking all mouse movements and keystrokes. Of most concern to privacy researchers is the correlation and linkage of the data points from individual users across multiple web pages and web sites, primarily because of the privacy side-effects this entails: such histories, linked with 'anonymous identifiers' can be easily linked back to the individuals to whom they belong [23] .
In this work we aim to measure the extent of this latter kind of tracking: the collection of linkable data points which generate a subset of users' browsing histories. As with other studies [10, 17, 13, 5] , we do this by instrumenting the browser to observe the requests made from each page visited, and looking for evidence of identifiers which could be used to link messages together. Unlike other studies, which generally set up automated crawls to popular domains, we deploy our probe to users of the Cliqz and Ghostery browser extensions. This gives several advantages:
• Scale: The probe is deployed to over 500,000 users, which gives us over 100 million page load measurements per month. Such scale cannot practically be achieved with crawlers.
• Client diversity: With over 500,000 users, we can obtain measurements from a myriad of network and system environments. This includes network location, ISP, Operating System, browser software and version, browser extensions and third-party software. All of these factors may have some influence on observed tracking. Previous studies using crawling suffer from a monoculture imposed by tooling limitations: Firefox on Linux in an Amazon data-centre.
• The non-public web: Stateless web crawling limits one's access to the public web only. These are pages which are accessible without any login or user-interaction required. This excludes a significant proportion of the web were tracking occurs, such as during payments on E-commerce sites, when accessing online banking, or on 'walled-gardens' such as Facebook [12] .
The downside of this approach is that when collecting data from real users as they browse the web, there could be privacy side-effects in the data we collect. We want to be able to measure the extent of tracking, but without collecting anything which could identify individuals, or even having any data value that someone may consider private. Therefore, great care must be taken in the collection methodology: what data can and cannot be collected, and how to transmit this privately. Due to these constraints, the data we can collect is of much lower resolution as what can be collected from crawling. Thus, we feel these two approaches can compliment each other in this regard. We describe our methodology of private data collection in this paper.
Tracking: a primer
Tracking can be defined as collecting data points over multiple different web pages and sites, which can be linked to individual users via a unique user identifier. The generation of these identifiers can be stateful, where the client browser saves an identifier locally which can be retrieved at a later time, or stateless, where information about the browser and/or network is used to create a unique fingerprint. In this section we summarise the common usage of these methods:
Stateful tracking
Stateful tracking utilises mechanisms in protocol and browser APIs in order to have the browser save an identifier of the tracking server's choosing, which can be retrieved and sent when a subsequent request is made to the same tracker.
The primary method is to utilise browser cookies, which is a mechanism to enable authentication on-topof HTTP. When a request is made to a server, the server responds with a header: Set-Cookie: <value> The browser will save the cookie's <value> for this domain. The next time the browser sends a request to the same domain, it will add the cookie header so that the server knows this is the same user as before.
As this mechanism is implemented by the browser, it is a client-side decision whether to honour this protocol, and how long to keep the cookies. Almost all browsers offer the option to block cookies for third-party domains when loading a web page, which would prevent this kind of tracking. However, browsers have defaulted to allowing all cookies for a long time, leading to many services and widgets (such as third-party payment and booking providers) relying on third-party cookies to function.
Other stateful methods include the JavaScript localStorage API [3] , which enables Javascript code to save data on the client side, and Cache-based methods using E-Tags [2].
Stateless tracking
Stateless tracking combines information about the target system via browser APIs and network information, which, when combined, creates a unique and persistent identifier for this device or browser [8, 21] . It differs from stateful methods in that this value is a product of the host system, rather than a saved state, and therefore cannot be deleted or cleared by the user.
Certain hardware attributes, which on their own may not be unique, when combined create a unique digital fingerprint, which renders it possible to identify a particular browser on a particular device [8] . This method will usually require code execution, either via JavaScript or Flash, which is enable gather the data from APIs which provide device attributes like the device resolution, browser window size, installed fonts and plugins, etc [21] . More advanced methods leverage observations of the ways different hardware render HTML Canvas data [4, 20] or manipulate audio data in order to generate fingerprints [10] .
Measuring Tracking Methods
In most cases, both stateful and stateless tracking can be measured from the browser. Measurement of stateful tracking is made easier by the origin requirements of the APIs being used. Both Cookies and localStorage sandbox data according to the domain name used by the accessing resource. For example, if a cookie is set for the domain track.example.com, this cookie can only be sent for requests to this address. This necessitates that trackers using these methods must always use the same domain in order to track across different sites. Thus, this origin requirement enables us measure a particular tracker's presence across the web via the presence of a particular third-party domain-the identifier cannot be read by other domains Stateless tracking does not have the same origin constraints as stateful tracking, therefore fingerprints could be transmitted to different domains, and then aggregated on the server side. Even though the use of stateful tracking is easier, due to the prevalence of browsers which will accept third-party cookies, we find that most trackers still centralise their endpoints. This is true also when 3rd parties engage in stateless tracking.
As stateless tracking uses legitimate browser APIs, we cannot assume simply that the use of these API implies that tracking is occurring. We use a method, based on our previous work, of detecting the transmission of data values which are unique to individual users [24] . We detect on the client side which values are unique based on a k-anonymity constraint: values which have been seen by fewer than k other users are considered as unsafe with respect to privacy. We can use this method as a proxy to measure attempted transmission of fingerprints generated with stateless tracking, as well as attempts to transmit identifiers from stateful methods over different channels.
Note that these detection methods assume that trackers are not obfuscating the identifiers they generate.
Browser Instrumentation
We measure tracking in the browser using a browser extension. This enables us to observe all requests leaving the browser and determining if they are in a tracking context or not. For each page loaded by the user, we are able to build a graph of the third-party requests made and collect metadata for each.
HTTP and HTTPS requests leaving a browser can be observed using the webRequest API 4 . This is a common API available on all major desktop web browsers. It provides hooks to listen to various stages of the lifecycle of a request, from onBeforeRequest, when the browser has initially created the intent to make a request, to onCompleted, once the entire request response has been received. These listeners receive metadata about the request at that point, including the url, resource type, tab from which the request originated, and request and response headers.
We first implement a system for aggregating information on a page load in the browser, enabling metadata, in the form of counters, to be added for each third-party domain contacted during the page load. We define a page load as being:
• Created with a web request of type main_frame in a tab;
• Containing the hostname and path extracted from the URL of the main frame request;
• Ending when another web request of type main_frame is observed for the same tab, or the tab is closed.
For each subsequent request for this tab, we assess whether the hostname in the url is third-party or not. This is done by comparing the Top-Level-Domain+1 (TLD+1) 5 forms of the page load hostname to that of the outgoing request. If they do not match, we add this domain as a third-party to the page load.
We collect metadata on third-party requests in three stages of the webRequest API: onBeforeRequest, onBeforeSendHeaders and onHeadersReceived. • In onBeforeRequest we first increment a counter to track the number of requests made for this domain. Additionally we count:
-the HTTP method of the request (GET or POST); -if data is being carried in the url, for example in the query string or parameter string; -the HTTP scheme (HTTP or HTTPS); -whether the request comes from the main frame or a sub frame of the page; -the content type of the request (as provided by the webRequest API); -if any of the data in the url is a user identifier, according to the algorithm from [24] .
• In onBeforeSendHeaders we are able to read information about the headers the browser will send with this request, and can therefore count whether cookies will be sent with this request.
• In onHeadersReceived we see the response headers from the server. We count:
-that this handler was called, to be compared with the onBeforeRequest count; -the response code returned by the server; -the content-length of the response (aggregated for all seen third-party requests); -whether the response was served by the browser cache or not; -whether a Set-Cookie header was sent by the server.
Together, these signals give us a a high level overview of what third-parties are doing in each page load:
• Cookie's sent and Set-Cookie headers received (in a third-party context) can indicate stateful tracking via Cookies. Empirical evaluation shows that the use of non-tracking cookies by third-parties is limited.
• HTTP requests on HTTPS pages show third-parties causing mixed-content warnings, and potentially leaking private information over unencrypted channels.
• The context of requests (main or sub frames) indicate how much access to the main document is given to the third-party.
• The content types of requests can tell us if the third-party is permitted to load scripts, what type of content they are loading (e.g. images or videos), and if they are using tracking APIs such as beacons 6 .
• The presence of user identifiers tells us that the third-party is transmitting fingerprints with requests, such as viewport sizes, or other tracking parameters.
• The difference between the number of requests seen by the onBeforeRequest and onHeadersReceived handlers indicates the presence of external blocking of this third-party, either at the network level or by another browser extension.
Once the described data on a page load has been collected, it is transmitted as a payload containing: the page's protocol (HTTP or HTTPS), the first-party hostname and path, and the set of third-parties on the page (TP).
The set of third-parties simply contain the third-party hostnames with their associated counters:
The nature of this data already takes steps to avoid recording at a level of detail which could cause privacy side-effects. In Section 3 we will describe these steps, and the further steps we take before transmitting this data, and in the transmission phase to prevent any linkage between any page load messages, nor any personal information in any individual message.
PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA COLLEC-TION
The described instrumentation collects information and metadata about pages loaded during users' normal web browsing activities. The collection of this information creates two main privacy challenges: First, an individual page load message could contain information to identify the individual who visited this page, compromising their privacy. Second, should it be possible to group together a subset of page load messages from an individual user, deanonymization becomes both easier, and of greater impact [23, 9] . In this section we discuss how these attacks could be exploited based-on the data we are collecting, and then, how we mitigate them.
Preventing message deanonymisation
The first attack attempts to find information in a pageload message which can be linked to an individual or otherwise leak private information. We can enumerate some possible attack vectors:
• Attack 1. The first-party hostname may be private. Network routers or DNS servers can arbitrarily create new hostnames which may be used for private organisation pages. A page load with such as hostname may then identify an individual's network or organisation.
• Attack 2. The hostname path combination often gives access to private information, for example sharing links from services such as Dropbox, Google Drive and others would give access to the same resources if collected. Similarly password reset urls could give access to user accounts.
• Attack 3. hostname and path combinations which are access protected to specific individuals could leak their identity if collected. For example, the twitter analytics page https://analytics.twitter. com/user/jack/home can only be visited by the user with twitter handle jack [19] .
• Attack 4. Third-party hostnames may contain user identifying information. For example, if an API call is made containing a user identifier in the hostname, it could be exploited to discover more about the user. While this is bad practice, as the user identifier is then leaked even for HTTPS connections, we have observed this in the wild [16] .
We mitigate attacks 1. and 2. by only transmitting a truncated MD5 hash 7 of the first-party hostname and path fields. By obfuscating the actual values of these fields we are still able to reason about popular websites and pages -the hashes of public pages can be looked up using a reverse dictionary attack -but private domains would be difficult to brute force, and private paths (e.g. password reset or document sharing links) are unfeasible. Therefore this treatment has desirable privacy properties, allowing us to still collect information about private pages without compromising their privacy and that of their users.
This treatment also mitigates some variants of attack 3., however for sites with a predictable url structure and public usernames (like in our twitter analytics example), it remains possible to lookup specific users by reconstructing their personal private url. We prevent this by further truncating the path before hashing to just the first level path, i.e. /user/jack/home would be truncated to /user/ before hashing. Attack 4. cannot be mitigated with the hashing technique, as we need to collect third-party domains in order to discover new trackers. We can, however, detect domains possibly using unique identifiers by counting the cardinality of subdomains for a particular domain, as well as checking that these domains persist over time. After manually checking that user identifiers are sent for this domain, we push a rule to clients which will remove the user identifier portion of these hostnames.
We also report these cases to the service providers, as this practice represents a privacy leak to bad actors on the network. We can further reduce the probability of collecting unique subdomains by truncating all domains to TLD+2 level.
Preventing message linkage
Even if individual messages cannot be deanonymised, if messages can be linked it is possible that as a group they can be deanonymised, as shown in recent examples deanonymising public datasets [23, 9] . Furthermore, if an individual message happens to leak a small amount of information, once linked with others the privacy compromise becomes much greater. Therefore, we aim to prevent any two pageload messages from being linkable to one-another.
The linking of messages requires the message sent from an individual user to be both unique, so that it does not intersect with others', and persistent, so that it can be used to link multiple messages together. We can enumerate some possible attacks:
• Referring to attack 4 from the previous section may also be used for linkage, if the unique hostname is used over several popular sites. For example a case we found with Microsoft accounts was prevalent across all Microsoft's web properties when a user was logged in. The third-party domain was specific to their account and did not change over time. This third-party domain would therefore be used to link all visits to Microsoft sites indefinitely.
• Attack 5. In a previous version of our browser instrumentation we collected the paths of thirdparty resources as truncated hashes. However, some resource paths could then be used for message linkage, for example avatars from third-party services such as Gravatar could be used to link visits on sites which display this avatar on every page for the logged in user. For this reason we removed collection of these paths.
• Attack 6. Some third-party requests can be injected into pages by other entities between the web and the user. ISPs can intercept insecure web traffic, Anti-virus software often stands as a Man in the Middle to all connections from the browser, and browser extensions can also inject content in the page via Content scripts. Any of these entities can cause additional third-parties to appear on page loads. It is possible that a combination of injected third-parties could become unique enough to act as a fingerprint of the user which could link page loads together.
• Attack 7. When data is uploaded from clients to our servers we could log the originating IP addresses of the senders in order to group the messages together, or utilise a stateful method to transmit user identifiers with the data.
We have already presented mitigations for the first two attacks. Attack 6. is difficult to mitigate for two reasons. Firstly, of the injected third-parties which we do detect, we cannot quantify the number of distinct users affected from the data that we collect. Therefore, it is not possible at the moment to calculate if certain combinations of third-parties would be able to uniquely identify an individual user. Secondly, a large proportion of these third-parties are injected by malware or other malicious actors, which implies an unstable ecosystem, where, as extensions get blocked and domains get seized, the set of injected third-parties will change. This also will have the effect that the persistence of the links will be limited. Despite this we aim to develop a mitigation method as part of our future work.
Attack 7 looks at the case where we ourselves might be either malicious or negligent as the data collector, creating a log which could be used to link the collected page loads back to pseudo-anonymous identifiers. It is important, that when monitoring trackers, we do not unintentionally become one ourselves. Trust is required, both that our client side code does not generate identifiers to be transmitted to the server along side the data, and that the server does not log IP addresses from which messages are received.
Trust in the client side is achieved by having the extension code open-sourced 8 , and the extension store review and distribution processes should, in theory, prevent a malicious patch being pushed to diverge from the public code. Furthermore, extensions can be audited in the browser to allow independent inspection of requests leaving the browser.
In order to allow the client to trust that the server is not using network fingerprints to link messages, we have developed a system whereby data is transmitted via proxies that can be operated by independent entities. Encryption is employed such that these proxies cannot read or infer anything about that transmitted data. The scheme is therefore configured such that the data collection server only sees data messages-striped of user IPs-coming from the proxies. The proxies see user IP addresses and encrypted blobs of data. Proxies visibility of message transmissions is limited by loadbalancing, which partitions the message space between the acting proxies, limiting how much metadata each is able to collect. The client-side part of this system also implements message delay and re-ordering to prevent timing-based correlations [18] .
The deployment of this system means that, if the user trusts the client-side implementation of this protocol, and the independence of the proxies, then he does not have to trust our data collection server to be sure we are not able to link messages together.
Privacy Evaluation
We have evaluated the risks in collecting the data gathered through our described browser instrumentation, and several steps which we take to mitigate and prevent these risks from being exploitable. We cannot prove completely anonymized data collection -we have made several improvements in response to findings from both internal and independent external audits of this data -however we regard this methodology as being robust, and if the data were to be leaked we are confident that the privacy consequences would be minimal.
DATA AGGREGATION
In this section we describe how the collected page load messages are aggregated to provide high-level statistics which describe the tracking ecosystem.
In previous studies of the tracking ecosystem, thirdparty domains have been truncated to TLD+1 level, and then aggregated. The reach of, for example google-analytics.com, will be then reported as the number of sites which have this domain as a third-party. This is a simple and easily understandable aggregation method, however it has some shortcomings:
• A domain name is not always transparent. For example it will not be apparent to everyone that the domain 2mdn.net is operated by Google's Doubleclick advertising network. It is important that the entities of the aggregation are meaningful and transparent.
• Domain level aggregation will duplicate information for service which use multiple domains in parallel. For example Facebook uses facebook.net to serve their tracking script, and then send tracking pixel requests to facebook.com, where the Facebook tracking cookie resides. According to domain semantics these are separately registered domains, though they will always occur together on web pages. Therefore reporting these two domains separately is redundant, and potentially misleading, as one might assume that the reach of the two entities can be added, when in fact they intersect almost entirely.
• Domain level aggregation will hide tracker entities who use a service on a subdomain owned by another organisation. The prime case here is Amazon's cloudfront.com CDN service. Several trackers simply use the randomly assigned cloudfront.com domains rather than use a CNAME to point to their own domain. For example New Relic 9 sometimes uses the d1ros97qkrwjf5.cloudfront.net domain. If we aggregate all Cloudfront domains together, the information about different trackers is lost.
We solve these issues by using a manually curated database, based on Ghostery's [11] tracker database, which maps domains and subdomains to the services and/or companies they are know to operate under, as a base. For a given domain, the database may contain multiple subdomains at different levels which are mapped to different services. When aggregating domains, we then find the matching T LD + N domain in the database, with maximal N . i.e. if we have mappings for a.example.com, b.example.com and example.com, then a.a.example.com would match to a.example.com, while c.example.com would be caught by the catch-all example.com mapping. These mappings allow us to split and aggregate domains in order to best describe different tracking entities.
The high level view of the data structure is shown in Figure 1 . The Tracker and Company tables also include further information about these entities, such as website urls, and links to privacy policies.
Different measurements of reach
The page load data we collect allows us to measure tracker and companies' reach in different ways. We define a tracker or company's 'reach' as the proportion 9 New Relic is an performance analytics service which reaches over 4% of web traffic as measured by our data of the web in which they are included as a third-party. This is done by counting the number of distinct page loads where the tracker occurs:
Alternatively, we can measure 'site reach', which is the proportion of websites (unique first-party hostnames) on which this tracker has been seen at least once.
site reach = |unique websites where tracker was seen| |unique websites| (4) Differences between these metrics are instructive: reach is weighted automatically by site popularity-a high reach combined with low site reach indicates a service which is primarily on popular sites, and is loaded a high proportion of the time on these sites. The inverse relation-low reach and high site reach-could be a tracker common on low traffic sites, or one which has the ability to be loaded on many sites (for example via high reach advertising networks), however does so rarely.
Aggregation of instrumentation counters
The reach metrics described are based on presencewhen requests occur in a page to specific third parties. In Section 2.2 we described other counters we collect in order to measure use of potential tracking vectors. We aggregate these statistics by counting the number of pages where these methods are invoked at least once during the page load, then report this metric as the proportion of the tracker's reach which used this method. We report:
• Cookie tracking context -Cookies sent with request, or server responded with a Set-Cookie header.
• Fingerprinting context -User identifier detected in the request (as per [24] ).
• Tracking context -Either cookie tracker or fingerprinting context, inclusive.
• Secure context -Only HTTPS requests for the page load.
• Content types -Pages where specific resource types were loaded by the tracker (e.g. scripts, iframes, plugins)
We also report the mean number of third-party requests per page for each tracker, and subset of these requests in a tracking context.
RESULTS
A behavioural analysis of tracking should consider all parties involved; users, first parties and third parties.
In the following sections, we will be looking at tracking data from three different perspectives: that of a user, a first party (website) and a 3rd party (tracker).
One important point to make, is that unlike other studies where the privacy measurement platform does not interact with sites the same way real users would [10] , the data we shall be analysing is generated by real users over the course of the last 10 months. This means our sample captures the behaviour of first and third parties, the same way as what we would see in reality. Each month contains data from ca. 100 million page loads. From May 2017 to February 2018, the number of page loads amounts to 784,400,000, making it the largest dataset on web tracking to our knowledge [10] .
Tracking: A user perspective
Users will be typically be using services of first parties. In the process, there is a hidden cost users are paying for inclusion of 3rd party scripts as they visit sites. As a proxy for cost, we measure the amount of data needed to load third party scripts.
Figure 2: Third party data consumption per page load
We take the sum of the Content-Length of all thirdparty requests in the top 600 websites over the last 10 months, and use boxplot to give a quick idea of their distribution. We clip outliers above 5 MB, as typically Audio video player trackers load content, which should not be attributed to tracking. Furthermore, on average about 22.5% of tracker requests go over HTTP.
Tracking: A 1
st party perspective
Here we will be looking at the tracking landscape on the top 600 websites. We assign to each first party a type, which describes purpose of website. Some of these types are News and Portals, Entertainment, Adult pages etc. For a complete list of definitions for first party types, see the Appendix, Exhibition A.
From our data, we measure that 89% of the traffic to the top 600 websites, contains tracking. On average a website loads about 10 trackers, and for each page load, doing 33 requests.
Figure 3: Distribution of average number of trackers across websites
To estimate the probability density function of the average number of trackers a first party loads, we use a kernel density estimate, which produces a long tailed distribution. This suggests there may be some variation in the expected number of trackers from site to site, and based on previous research from [10] , the website type may explain some of this variation.
Indeed when we control for the type of the first party, there are clear differences in the average number of trackers observed.
Figure 4: Average number of trackers by website type
We can also make use of the longitudinal data for particular first parties, showing how we can measure trends and behaviours with respect to the inclusion of third parties over time.
Figure 5: News Portals example -Average Trackers over time
In this example, we compare Le Figaro  10 and The Guardian 11 with the News and Portals average number of trackers over time. We observe the number of third party trackers for the last 10 months fluctuates. This is especially helpful for monitoring first party behaviour, and can easily be extended to distinguish between different types of trackers they load or the frequency of appearance of a tracker on a given page load of a certain site.
Tracking: A 3
rd party perspective
Third parties largely operate in ways that makes the user not be able to identify their presence in a site, without the assistance of software that provides some transparency and blocking functionality, such as Ghostery. In this context, the reach of a given tracker, or company is an important metric to infer the tracking market structure.
In Figure 6 we list the trackers with the highest site reach.
Note that these trackers do not always operate in a tracking context, which given our definition of 3rd party tracking, means they do not always send unique user identifiers. For instance, Google APIs is mostly used to load other 3rd parties such as Google Fonts and other non-tracking APIs, so it largely operates in a non-tracking context 12 . While the tracker reach in figure 6 gives an overview of the most prevalent tracking scripts, to better understand the tracking market structure, one must group 10 https://lefigaro.fr 11 https://theguardian.com 12 NB: Tracking as defined in this paper. tracking may still occur Doing so, we notice that 3rd party scripts owned by Google are present in about 80% of the measured web traffic, and operate in a tracking context for more than half that time. Facebook and Amazon follow next.As the data is predominantly from German users as present, we see services specific to the German market, such as InfOnline, ranked highly.
Most third parties are loaded to perform certain functions which first parties have an interest in. We notice that among third parties with the highest reach, those that provide advertising services are predominant, representing 42% of the top 600. Definitions of tracking services can be found in the Exhibit B of the Appendix.
One of the important contributions this data makes to tracking studies, is the perspective it offers to monitor behaviour over time. As such, we can monitor the reach of trackers, or companies over time. In Fig. 9 , we see how the reach of the top most prevalent trackers changes over time. This outlines the dynamics of tracking as a market.
WHOTRACKS.ME WEBSITE
Longitudinal studies have typically been done on a smaller scale to one-off crawls [13, 14] . Having a clear snapshot view of tracking at scale is important, but this often means the dynamics of tracking over time, are lost. WhoTracks.Me focuses on exactly that. It offers a high level of granularity of tracking behaviour over time, making it a space that hosts the largest dataset of tracking on the web, and a detailed analysis of the data for the latest month (the snapshot view). The site offers detailed profiles of popular 1st and 3rd parties. These are respectively referred to as websites and trackers.
For each website, we detail a list of data that infers the tracking landscape in that website. The data includes the number of trackers detected to be present at an average page load of that website as well as the total number of trackers observed in the last month. Furthermore, a distribution of services the present 3rd parties perform on that page, is also provided.
To map the tracker categories to the seen trackers, we use a sankey diagrams (e.g. Figure 11 ) which are well suited to visualise flow volume metrics. This enables us to link the category of the tracker, to the companies that operate the trackers, weighing the links as function of the frequency with which a tracker appears the given site.
For each tracker profile, we provide the information needed to identify them; the list of domains it uses to collect data, the company that owns them, reach and site reach as defined in equations 3 and 4), as well as the methods they use for tracking. Furthermore, we provide information on the distribution of the types of websites they are seen to be present, and other similar 3rd parties. For an example, please refer to Figure 12 or visit a tracker profile on WhoTracks.Me 13 .
Who is WhoTracks.Me for?
WhoTracks.Me is a monitoring and transparency tool. We have open sourced data from more than 100 million page loads per month, and commit to continue the effort. As tersely demonstrated in Section 5, the possibilities for using the data are numerous and the users diverse:
• Researchers -Can use the open data to investigate tracking technologies, develop more comprehensive protection mechanisms and threat models, investigate the underlying structure of online tracking as a marketplace etc.
• Regulators -The ability to access both detailed snapshots of tracking data as well as observe entities over time, enables regulators to use WhoTracks.Me as a monitoring tool to measure the [7] and ePrivacy [1] .
• Journalists -Regardless of whether one takes the angle of the market structure of online tracking, or conceptually facilitating the education of the consumers on the issue, journalists will have enough data to derive insights from.
• Web Developers -Certain third-party scripts that web developers may add to their sites, have the capacity of loading other third parties, which the web developer may or may not know about. This, for instance, is the typical behaviour of ad networks like DoubleClick 14 . Web developers can use WhoTracks.Me to keep an eye on the extent to which they retain control over third parties loaded, which will be important in the context of GDPR compliance [7] . Furthermore, not doing so can often have undesired consequences. This was the case when a third party was compromised and started loading a cryptocurrency mining script in the website of the Internet Commissioner's Office ico.org.uk in the UK and more than 4000 other websites where this third party was present 15 . 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
As the line between the physical and online lives becomes more blurred, we believe online privacy will gain the attention of academics, regulators, media and users at large. In the context of paving the way for a constructive approach to dealing with online tracking, we open source the WhoTracks.Me data, which we plan to maintain, and update on a monthly basis. This paper, and the living representation of it: WhoTracks.Me , contribute to the body of research, and public sphere more broadly, in the following ways:
• Largest dataset on web tracking to our knowledge. This assists researchers, regulators, journalists, web developers and users in developing efficient tools, devising policies and running awareness campaigns to address the negative externalities tracking introduces.
• Longitudinal Data: While snapshots of data are necessary, in a highly non-transparent environment, like online tracking, for the purpose of monitoring it is also important to have have longitudinal data.
WhoTracks.Me open sources data from the longest measurement of web tracking to date.
• Measuring without platform-side-effects: The data is generated by the behaviour of real users, which means the data is not prone to effects introduced by the measuring platform.
• Human-Machine cooperation: A significant amount of browser privacy tools, rely on publicly maintained block lists. WhoTracks.Me data contains trackers profiled algorithmically, as presented in [24] . Assisting the maintenance of blocklists, the community can focus on the accuracy of demographic data of the identified trackers, thus collectively improving transparency.
• Measuring the effects of regulation: The longitudinal nature of the data, enables users of WhoTracks.Me to measure the effects of regulation on the tracking landscape. An example of such application will be the measuring of the effects the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), in May 2018 will have on tracking practices.
Online tracking is an industry of shady practices, and we believe there is a dire need for ongoing transparency, accountability and a healthier web where user data is not treated as merchandise or subject to negligence and users not robbed of their privacy.
Given increasing concern over the data collected by often nameless third-parties across the web, and consumers' struggles to keep control of their data trails, more transparency and accountability is required in the ecosystem. This work represents a step-change in the quantity and depth of information available to those who wish to push for a healthier web. distribute, and optimise video and audio content.
CDN -Content delivery network that delivers resources for different site utilities and usually for many different customers.
Misc (Miscellaneous) -This tracker does not fit in other categories.
Hosting -This is a service used by the content provider or site owner.
Unknown -This tracker has either not been labelled yet, or we do not have enough information to label it.
